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Using a newly assembled dataset spanning from 1820 to 1998, we study the 
relationship between the occurrence and cruelty of episodes of mass killing and the 
levels of development and democracy across countries and over time. We find that 
massacres are more likely at intermediate levels of income and less likely at very 
high levels of democracy, but we do not find evidence of a linear relationship 
between democracy and probability of mass killings.  In the 20th century, discrete 
improvements in democracy are systematically associated with less cruel massacre 
episodes. Episodes at the highest levels of democracy and income involve relatively 
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When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities 
become irrelevant.  Whenever men or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political 





th century closed with many lamenting civilian killings by the state 
(including genocide) as its greatest evil. By one estimate, governments killed as many as 
170 million civilians from 1900 to 1987 – more than all the soldiers killed in the wars of 
the 20
th century.
1  The century closed with a new euphemism for killing and deportation: 
“ethnic cleansing.” Massacres in the Balkans and the 1994 Rwandan genocide led to 
much ex post agonizing about what international policymakers could do to prevent or 
stop mass killings of civilians  The new millennium has already featured killings of 
people whose sole fault is their membership in a group defined by the killers. Killing 
innocent people, even when the numbers are small relative to population, leaves indelible 
human scars in the affected groups and a lasting mark on subsequent politics. 
Even granting that it is a great evil, however, why should development 
economists study mass killings when a vast literature by political scientists and other 
researchers already exists (see references in Charny,1999, as well as our own 
bibliography)? The first reason is the broader definition of development increasingly 
adopted by many academics and development practitioners, which includes many aspects 
of well-being besides just measuring GDP.  Freedom from the risk of being killed by the 
state, and freedom from having your "group" being the target of violence, is surely an 
important component of social well-being.  The second is that political violence has 
major consequences for economic development even in the narrow sense, sometimes with  
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decades of development efforts undone by outbreaks of violence. The third is that the 
likelihood of political violence may depend on economic incentives and behaviors. Due 
to such considerations, political violence (especially civil war) has recently become a 
major subject for research among economists. 
2  
Due in part to the recent literature on political violence,  violence (and its 
corollary, the breakdown of state authority or “state failure”) has become something that 
international development policy makers like the World Bank, United Nations, or OECD 
seek to address. Altogether, five different articles in Foreign Affairs in the past few years 
have analyzed what international policy makers could do about failed states.
3 In a recent 
report, the World Bank made the claim “Our new understanding of the causes and 
consequences of civil wars provides a compelling basis for international action. … 
International action … could avert untold suffering, spur poverty reduction, and help to 
protect people around the world from … drug-trafficking, disease, and terrorism.”
4  
Although we are cautious in thinking that economic research can develop a 
comprehensive understanding of such a complex problem, we share the interest of the 
economics of violence literature in understanding the determinants of the many forms of 
political violence. This paper represents an important extension of that literature, as the 
phenomenon of mass killing has received little attention so far in the literature by 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Rummel (1997). 
2 Some references from the large literature by economists includes Collier (1999), Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998, 2002a, 2002b, and 2004), Azam and Hoeffler (2002), Stewart et al. (2001), and Reynal-Querol 
(2002a and 2002b). See World Bank (2003) for a more comprehensive list of references. 
3 Sebastian Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, the Case for American Empire,” 
Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002); Chester Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,” Foreign Affairs, 
(September/October 2003); Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, “Rebuilding 
Weak States,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005), Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, 
“Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2005), Stephen Ellis, “How to Rebuild Africa” 
Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005). 
4World Bank (2003) p.168.  
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economists. Like civil war, mass killings seem a priori likely to have huge economic 
consequences, and to possibly be influenced by economic factors.  More over, mass 
killings are one of the main components of definitions of “state failure.” 
Economic development is potentially a two-edged sword for mass killings of 
civilians by the state. On the one hand, economic development leads to increased 
education that might promote greater tolerance of other groups besides one's own.  From 
a more cold-hearted calculation, economic development is an increase in the productivity 
of labor and hence the value of human life. On the other hand, economic development 
brings advances in technology and social organization that lower the cost of mass 
killings. Murderous political leaders can use advanced technology and social organization 
to kill.  
One factor that might resolve the ambiguity between development and massacres 
is institutions. Good institutions will presumably increase the likelihood that technology 
and organization are used for benevolent ends. The most obvious institution that has been 
developed to ensure benevolent governments is democracy, which places limits on the 
ability of the executive to carry out destructive acts against the electorate. Indeed, one of 
the most famous hypotheses about genocide is that "power kills; absolute power kills 
absolutely" (Rummel, 1997).  
However, again there is some ambiguity about the relationship between 
democracy and episodes of massacre and genocide. A majority of the population may 
democratically agree on the killing of an unpopular minority.  Famous historical 
examples are the democratic governments in Australia, Canada, and the United States  
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who killed indigenous peoples.  So it is still an open empirical question about whether 
democracy successfully turns economic development towards benevolent ends. 
These are the questions that motivate our study. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, using historical records and 
sources, we compile a new dataset listing occurrence and cruelty of episodes of mass 
killing by the state over the XIXth and XXth century. We then couple this information 
with historical series on the extent of democracy and on GDP and conduct a systematic 
analysis – to our knowledge the first of its kind – of the relationship among these 
variables. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the definitions of our main 
variables and section III describes data sources and summary statistics. Sections IV and V 
discuss regression results and robustness checks. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Defining  mass killing episodes  
In the process of identifying episodes of mass killings of civilians by the state one has to 
confront the question of defining genocide. There are many contentious issues in this 
field. First, a number of scholars  − especially in the past – have disputed whether 
comparative analysis of genocide is at all meaningful, given the unique characteristics of 
each episode, however genocide is defined. Nonetheless, more and more scholars have 
recently advocated the use of comparative research on genocide as an instrument to 
understand which underlying conditions are more likely to put a polity at risk. In the 
words of Barbara Harff, one of the most prominent scholars in the current literature, “All 
cases have unique properties but also share some discernible patterns with others, from  
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which social scientists can identify some common sequences and outcomes” (Harff, 
1992, p. 30). 
Although in 1948 the United Nations adopted an official definition of genocide, 
scholars are far from agreeing on how genocide should be defined, often arguing over 
narrow versus more inclusive definitions. A narrow definition, for example, is that 
genocide must involve the intention to exterminate an ethnic group. There are very few 
such episodes, with scholars usually referring to the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews and, 
more recently, the Hutu killings of Tutsis in Rwanda. This definition would leave out 
mass killings of political victims, such as those in Cambodia, China, and the USSR. In 
the view of many scholars, massacres of political victims should also be including  in  a 
more comprehensive definition of genocide  (see, for example, Harff, 1987, who focuses, 
amongst others, on politicides – i.e. genocides, where victims are defined primarily in 
terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant group; and Horowitz, 
1997). According to others, instead, the clear intent to eliminate a group (where a group 
and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator and not by external fixed criteria) is 
the relevant element that distinguishes a genocide from other gross human rights 
violations (Chalk and Jonasshon, 1987). 
A complementary approach is that of classifying genocides based on the motives 
of the perpetrators, whether these were desire for revenge – as it was typical of ancient 
times (examples are the massacres perpetuated by Genghis Khan); an accessory to 
military conquest, as it was often the case in the middles ages; or a means to monopolize 
power or to impose an ideology (Smith, 1987).   
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Within this debate, there are a few elements of general convergence. For example, 
authors uniformly stress the disparity of power between perpetrators and the victim group 
as a typical characteristic of genocide and tend to exclude victims of warfare and 
bombings. 
In this work, we define episodes of mass killings following the highly inclusive 
definition of Charny (1999, p. 7):  
Genocide ... is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, 
when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an 
avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and 
helplessness of the victims.  
 
The word genocide has become politically explosive, with states threatening 
reprisals against other states that publicly identify a historical episode as a "genocide".  
Other political activists have watered down the definition to label almost any government 
policy (abortion, economic sanctions, monetary policy) as "genocide" against some 
group.  A search on the word "genocide" on Yahoo turned up 141,000 web pages.  
To stay out of politics while at the same time communicating clearly, we adopt 
the following compromise. Throughout the paper we refer to episodes interchangeably as 
“mass killings” or “massacres”. We do not intend this wording to be a euphemism for 
“genocide,” since we not believe that all episodes in our sample were genocides. We 
simply avoid the loaded word “genocide” altogether.  We adopt the broad definition 
advocated by Charny in the paragraph above for “mass killings.”  In most cases, the state 
is either actively or passively involved in the killings, although there are some borderline 
cases where we cannot distinguish between people killed by state forces versus other 
armed forces.
5 Note that we do not identify episodes ourselves, but we include in our 
                                                 
5 In particular, we do not include in our definition victims from international wars.    
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sample episodes that have been identified as mass killings over the past two centuries by 
other academic researchers. The standard generally followed by these researchers is 
compatible with Charny’s definition. 
We choose the last two centuries because that is the period over which democracy 
and income data are available. In this sample, we counted a total of 163 episodes of mass 
killings in 71 countries. 
A research assistant and one of the coauthors, who did not hold any priors with 
respect to the relationship among development, democracy, and mass killings, performed 
the literature search. Given limited resources to search the literature, we cannot argue that 
our list is exhaustive.  We could hope that such errors of inclusion and exclusion are 
random, so that we can still estimate unbiased coefficients on the variables of interest, 
development and democracy.  
Unfortunately, there is likely to still be some association between probability of 
inclusion in the sample and our right-hand side variables. Societies that are more 
democratic, and thus have freedom of speech and press, are more likely to record any 
episodes of mass killings, while authoritarian societies may keep mass killings a secret 
from the history books. This is likely to generate a selection bias against mass killings 
that occur in less democratic societies.  
In addition, societies at a lower level of income are less likely to have information 
on the democracy level of their regime, or they are a colony of another nation and so are 
not counted in the democracy sample. Low income also makes it more likely that income 
itself will not be recorded. Hence our sample that includes observations on mass killings,  
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development, and democracy is likely to under-represent low-income societies. However, 
these problems are common to similar cross-country studies. 
 
III. Data description 
Our income data are drawn from different sources. For the 19
th century, Maddison 
estimates income in 1820, 1850, and 1870, and then yearly after 1870.  This procedure 
might be thought to under-represent the middle-income experience of today’s industrial 
countries, which took place mainly between 1820 and 1870.  We know with some degree 
of approximation that income was in the middle-income range in the intervening years if 
it was in the middle-income range in both 1820 and 1850, and likewise with 1850 to 
1870. In order to maximize the size of our sample and, in particular, to obtain sufficient 
data for the XIXth century, we interpolate income linearly from 1820 to 1850 and from 
1850 to 1870. Income data for the period 1950-1990 is drawn from Summers and Heston 
and is updated and filled in with World Bank National Accounts per capita growth rates 
up through 1998. 
Measuring democracy is more problematic as there are many angles to its 
definition. For example, democracy can be measured as a continuum representing the 
degree to which coercive regime power penetrates and controls political and socio-
economic institutions; as the degree of effective political competition; or as the degree of 
concentration and centralization of political power (Rummel, 1997). Although there exist 
in the literature a number of indicators that are meant to capture the different dimensions 
of democracy, none of them is available for the period that our data span. To be able to 
analyze our full data set, we use a democracy variable from the well-known Polity III  
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project at the University of Maryland that covers an exceptionally long period: 1800-
1998. This variable captures important procedural elements of democratic institutions.
6 In 
particular, it measures the degree of openness of the political process by ranking regimes 
according to the competitiveness of participation to political life (i.e. the extent to which 
non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression); the type of 
competition for executive recruitment (i.e. the extent to which executives are chosen 
through competitive elections); the openness of the executive recruitment (i.e. the 
opportunity for non-elites to attain executive office); and, finally, the degree of   
constraints on the executive (i.e. the operational independence of chief executive). The 
index is measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Its construction is described in detail in 
Appendix I. Mass killings episodes are listed and described in Appendix II. 
 
IV. Descriptive analysis 
  We first present some descriptive analysis of the association between 
development, democracy, and mass killings. In the following sections, we will discuss 
formal econometric analysis of the data. 
Our data are characterized by infrequent mass killing episodes taking place over 
the period 1820-1995 and by strings of missing values in the income data, especially as 
far as the XIXth and the beginning of the XXth century are concerned. The peculiar 
structure of the data makes the choice of how to setup the timing of the regressions − 
whether in a single cross-section, by century, decades or year − particularly relevant. 
Arranging the data by decades allows us to strike a reasonable balance between being 
                                                 
6 We should also note that some definitions of democracy (a regime could be defined democratic if it does 
not commit massacres, genocides, etc) would be tautological in the context of this paper (Jonasson, 1990).  
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able to link episodes of mass killings to income levels relatively close in time and 
avoiding a misleading multiplication of observations that would occur, for example, with 
annual data.  
To identify massacres we use a dummy for those years and countries in which a 
mass killing episodes occurred. In our setup, this amounts to having an indicator variable 
taking value of 1 if a massacre occurred in the decade. In this sense, this dummy 
measures the frequency of mass killings but not their magnitude, as it does not use 
information on the number of victims. We then present data on the estimated numbers of 
victims associated with each episode. These estimates are usually given in the original 
bibliography as a range of estimated victims, and we take the mean of the minimum and 
maximum of the available estimates. 
To summarize the interrelationships among democracy, development, and mass 
killings, we segment the sample of more than 1000 observations into quartiles of income 
per capita and democracy. Cutoffs for income quartiles are at $908, $1671 and $3619 in 
1985 dollars. The low quartile of democracy is at zero, while the other cutoffs are at 3 
and 8.78.  Figures 1-4 show the frequency and number of mass killings in the different 
quartiles of development and democracy.  
A simple correlation between massacre frequency and per capita income over the 
whole sample suggests a negative relationship between the two variables (correlation of -
0.11). Interestingly, though, the graph of massacre frequency by income quartiles indicate 
that the unconditional relationship between the two is far from being linear – although 
massacres appear to be very frequent among the poorest countries and least frequent 
among the richest countries, they are most frequent in middle income countries (third 
                                                                                                                                                 
Our index does not suffer from this problem.  
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quartile, see figure 1). When we split the sample by century, massacres are positively and 
significantly correlated with income in the XIXth century (correlation of 0.33) while they 
are less likely to occur in richer countries in the XXth century (correlation of –0.18). This 
is not surprising since most massacres recorded in the XIXth century were in fact 
perpetrated by imperialist (richer) countries in the context of their colonization policies. 
Overall, mass killings are weakly negatively correlated with democracy 
(correlation of -0.08). The relationship between massacres and democracy is also not 
linear, with massacre frequency being the highest at intermediate levels of democracy 
(third quartile) while being the lowest among the countries with the highest level of 
democracy (see figure 2). Moreover, similarly to what we observe for the massacre-
income relationship, massacres were more likely in relatively more democratic countries 
in the XIXth century, while democracy and mass killings are negatively correlated in the 
XXth century (correlations of, respectively, 0.42 and -0.16). 
Table 1 presents democracy and income quartiles together in a 4 by 4 table.   
Again, we see some hints of results we will explore further – the relationship with income 
seems nonlinear, and controlling for income, democracy does not seem to have a 
straightforward relationship with the likelihood of mass killings. Overall, it is clear that 
the likelihood of mass killings is lower than in the rest of the sample at the highest 
quartiles of both democracy and income. 
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Table 1: Four by four classification of sample of mass killings by income and democracy quartiles
7 
democracy quartile (4= most democratic) 
Percent of sample 
with mass killings 
(observations in 
each cell in italics)   1 2 3 4
1  28% 24% 15% 33%
  105 86 40 3
2  15% 13% 19% 44%
  71 83 70 9
3  13% 25% 31% 12%
  48 51 85 50
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  We next turn to data on the magnitude of mass killings. 
Consistently with the setup of our dataset, we measure the magnitude of killings 
as the average number of victims per decade. Figures 3 and 4 plot the average number of 
people killed by decade by democracy and income quartiles.
8 The average number of 
victims appears to decrease monotonically with income per capita in the whole sample.
9 
Interestingly, the highest average number of victims is not recorded at the lowest level of 
democracy (totally authoritarian governments) but at intermediate-low levels of 
democracy (second quartile). A look at sheer magnitudes returns a frightening picture 
(figure 5): our data suggests that an estimated 70 million people were killed in the past 
two centuries by non-democratic governments (first and second quartiles of democracy). 
In general, high democracy appears to be the single most important factor in avoiding 
large magnitudes of mass killings, as the highest quartile of the sample in democracy 
                                                 
7 Note that, as in the regression setup, these are decade average data. Thus, it only takes one mass killing in 
a year to identify a whole decade.   
8 The number of victims was assigned to decades as follows. We first calculated the average number of 
victims per year in each episodes; then we apportioned the average annual number of victims to the decades  
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accounts for only 0.1% percent of all the killings. These unconditional associations 
confirms Rummel’s hypothesis that authoritarian power is an important predictor of 
large-scale killings. The contrast with the conclusions on frequency highlights the fact 
that killing episodes at high levels of democracy and income involved relatively few 
victims. 
Another noticeable feature of the data is that a small number of episodes accounts 
for the majority of killings in the data. The five largest episodes – China 1850-73, 1920-
48, and 1949-53, the USSR 1930-38, and Germany 1933-45 – account for 71 percent of 
all killings, and these episodes involve only three polities.
10  In order to avoid the obvious 
problems that this characteristic of the data would create in tobit regressions, we use as 
dependent variable the logarithm of average killings per decade.  
Finally, there were some well-known large-scale killings on which we lack 
complete data on income or democracy, and are therefore excluded from the data. These 
are: Cambodia (1975-79); Poland (1945-47); Ex-Yugoslavia (1900-99); Rwanda (1994); 
Mozambique (1973-75). 
  
V. Econometric analysis of mass killings 
V.1 What makes mass killings more likely? 
We first analyze the association between the probability that an episode of mass 
killing occurs and our main variables of interest, the levels of development and 
democracy of a country. We report estimates in table 2, where the dependent variable 
                                                                                                                                                 
spanned by the mass killing. Because of this convention, information on the intensity of each episode 
cannot be captured by our data. 
9 Simple correlations suggest that this is the case also in each century. 
10 The USSR 1930-38 episode is split between low and medium development because of rising Soviet 
income in the 30s.  
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takes value of 1 if at least an episode of mass killing occurred during the decade and 0 
otherwise.
11  
Due to the length of the time period considered, the number of variables that we 
can use as regressors is limited. Our main independent variables are average (log) per 
capita GDP over the decade (LNGDPPC, interpolated when missing) and level of 
democracy (DEMOCRACY). We also include in all of the regression a dummy for the 
XXth century to account for possible systematic differences in the occurrence of mass 
killings in the two centuries, as well as the log of the country’s population to control for 
some basic country characteristics. 
Although we experiment with a number of specifications, we should note a priori 
that teasing out the independent effects of income and democracy on mass killings might 
not be straightforward, since the correlation between the two variables over the whole 
sample is quite high (0.55).  
One of the widely held tenets about mass killings is that democracy can prevent 
them (see for example Rummel, 1997, and Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). We find that, 
when included alone in the regression, the level of democracy is significantly associated 
(at the 10% level) with a lower occurrence of mass killings (column 1). Nonetheless, and 
quite surprisingly, when we include income per capita in the regression, DEMOCRACY 
ceases to be significant. 
We have seen that the unconditional relationship between frequency of mass 
killings and democracy is not monotonic. This suggests that it might be helpful to control 
for democracy in a flexible form. Consistently with the picture in figure 2, when we 
include indicators for democracy quartiles, mass killings appear to be relatively less 
                                                 
11 Note that, in this setup, an episode spanning two decades is effectively counted as two episodes.  
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frequent in the second and fourth quartile. Nonetheless, the estimated effects are not 
significant once we contemporaneously control for income levels (columns 5).
12 
Similarly, a dummy identifying those countries with democracy above the median in the 
sample is not significant (column  6). Instead, a dummy for whether the country 
experienced continuous “perfect” democracy throughout the whole decade (i.e. whether 
the democracy index was equal to 10 for the whole decade) is significantly associated 
with lower occurrence of mass killings. This association survives the inclusion of income 
in the regression, both linearly and quadratically (columns 7 and 8). The effect is large. 
According to the point estimate, a jump towards “perfect” democracy would be 
associated with about 2/3 reduction in the probability of massacres (a decrease of 0.11 
points from a sample average of 0.17). As for income, (log) GDP is in general negatively 
and significantly associated with the occurrence of mass killings. In particular, a 
quadratic specification seems to fit the data particularly well. The estimates suggest that 
the chances of massacres increase for income levels below about $900 per capita 
(corresponding to the lowest income quartile in the whole sample), while they decrease 
afterwards. The quadratic specification for income seems fairly robust to controlling for 
democracy in alternative ways. P-values associated with the likelihood ratio test are 
reported at the bottom of columns 4-7. 
13 
A natural extension would be to control for both income and democracy flexibly. 
When we include in the regression dummies for democracy and income quartiles, 
                                                 
12 If income is excluded from the set of regressors, mass killings are significantly less frequent among the 
countries in the fourth quartile of democracy. 
13 A rule of thumb indicates that this specification seems to predict the probability of the outcomes fairly 
well (83% of the cases).   
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massacres appear to be less frequent in countries at the highest income quartiles but, not 
significantly so in countries at the highest democracy quartile (column 9). 
The simple correlations between mass killings and income suggest that this 
relationship has changed over time. In the XIXth century, mass killings were more likely 
in relatively richer countries, while in the XXth century, mass killings more likely to 
occur in poorer countries. This is not surprising when one realizes that many of the mass 
killings episodes in the XIXth were perpetrated by rich countries’ governments in the 
process of establishing their authority on the colonies. In the XXth century, instead, mass 
killings tend to occur more frequently in relatively less developed countries. A similar 
unconditional result obtains for democracy. We explore these issues in detail in table 3. 
 First, we refine our basic specification by adding pre- and post- World Wars 
dummies. None of these is significant. Then we restrict the sample to the XX century.  As 
before, we experiment with different specifications, including quadratic and linear 
income, and non-linear forms for both income and democracy (columns 2-5). Quadratic 
income has now a weaker fit, while linear income produces better estimates. Overall, it 
appears that mass killings in the XXth century are significantly less frequent in countries 
at the top quartiles of democracy and economic development. (column 5). 
We are also able to explore the role of a few other potentially relevant correlates. 
For example, a growing body of literature has analyzed the role of ethnic fractionalization 
as an impediment to effective public policies and, ultimately, to economic growth and as 
a determinant of civil war (see for example Easterly and Levine, 1997, who discuss the 
role of ethnic fractionalization in “Africa’s growth tragedy” and Collier and Hoeffler, 
1999, who analyze the role of fractionalization in the context of civil wars). In our  
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analysis, understanding the role of the ethnic structure of a country is particularly 
relevant, especially as most of the episodes are classified as “ethnic or communal” 
killings. When we add to the basic specification the measure of ethnic fractionalization 
developed by Alesina et al. (2003), we find that the probability of mass killings is related 
quadratically to fractionalization. In particular, the chances of mass killing increase at 
levels of fractionalization below 0.46, a value slightly above the sample mean, and 
decrease thereafter (column 6). The fractionalization measure captures the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups. Hence, a 
situation in which there are two groups with equal shares in the population would have a 
fractionalization index of 0.5, close to the maximum threat of massacres. A more 
ethnically fractionalized situation with many small groups may be less likely to erupt in 
killings of one group by another than one with fewer and larger groups.  
Finally, we are able to correlate episodes of mass killings with indicator dummies 
for civil wars and colonial, imperial or international wars.
14 We find mass killings to be 
significantly more frequent during civil wars, and marginally so during colonial, imperial 
or international wars. 
 
V.2 What makes episodes of mass killing more cruel? 
We collected data on the estimated number of deaths associated with each mass 
killings episode. There is a substantial uncertainty on the estimated number of victims. 
For most episodes, we have interval estimates of minimum and maximum number of 
killings; sometimes, instead, the source reported average number of deaths. Our measure 
                                                 
14 Note that these indicators were built independently from our mass killings variable (Singer and Small, 
1994).  
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of the number of victims is the average number of deaths, where the maximum 
(minimum) of the range is the maximum (minimum) number of deaths among all of the 
sources we draw upon. Given the large variation in the nature and magnitude of the 
episodes (combined with the presence of substantial outliers), using a log transformation 
of the data seemed a sensible choice. 
Figures 6 and 7 depict unconditional relationships between (log of) average 
killings and, respectively, democracy and income per capita. 
We apply tobit analysis to explore the relationship between the magnitude of mass 
killings, per capita income, and democracy.  In parallel with the probit analysis, we 
experiment with different specifications − including linear and quadratic income, and 
non-linear specifications in democracy. All of the specifications include the (log of) 
population in order to provide a scale for the size of the country, and a dummy for 
whether the episode occurred in the XXth century. 
The results, reported in table 4, suggest that there is evidence for an inverted U-
shaped relationship between per capita income and killings. In particular, the number of 
victims peaks at around $1300 of per capita income (slightly below the sample average). 
In general, we find the magnitude of mass killing to be negatively associated with 
DEMOCRACY, but the weak statistical significance does not allow meaningful 
inferences.  
We then investigate the relationship between income and killings allowing for 
different slopes in the XIXth and XXth century (table 5). We find that the quadratic 
relationship between income and killings still holds. Moreover, and more importantly,  
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democracy is now linearly associated with a lower number of victims (at the 10% level of 
significance, column 1). 
Interestingly, we find no relationship between the magnitude of mass killings and 
ethnic fractionalization, while mass killings appear to be substantially larger if the 
episode occurred within a civil or international war (columns 2-5). 
 
V. 3 Robustness checks 
We test the robustness of our results by performing estimation under a set of 
alternative assumptions. 
To the extent that we are interested in income as an explanatory variable for 
occurrence of mass killings, using interpolated income might introduce a further element 
of endogeneity in the relationship − episodes of massacres might cause substantial 
economic disruptions and drops in income, with the last occurring at different rates in 
different countries. In the context of our analysis, this potential problem should be 
weighed against the benefit of being able to work with a larger sample size and a more 
substantial representation of countries in the XIXth century. However, in order to make 
sure that our results are not driven by interpolation we run all of our regressions over the 
non-interpolated sample. We find that our main result related to income – that occurrence 
and magnitude of mass killings has a quadratic relationship with income – hold. 
Similarly, results are virtually unchanged if lagged values of income and 
democracy are entered in the specification instead of contemporaneous values. These 
findings are reassuring but we do not claim that this resolves the intractable problem of 
causality between income (or democracy) and mass killings. We interpret our results as 
suggestive associations rather than decisive indications of causality.  
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One might also argue that our results are a product of the arbitrary decision of 
organizing the data by decades. To verify that this is not the case, we run all of our 
regressions on data organized by twenty-year periods. Here as well, our main results 
hold. Moreover, the organization of the data in ten year periods generates a possible built-
in over-counting of episodes, when episodes start in one decade and finish in the 
following decade. To make sure that our results are not driven by any double counting of 
episodes, we run our probit specifications using as a dependent variable a dummy taking 
value of one in the decade when an episode began and zero otherwise. Also in this case, 
the quadratic relationship between income and mass killing occurrence persists and, 
similarly to the results reported in the previous tables, no linear relationship emerges 
between mass killings and democracy. 
Finally, one could object that our data includes very heterogeneous episodes, 
particularly as the number of victims is concerned. Moreover, as we previously 
discussed, non-democratic governments might have made efforts to keep episodes of 
mass killings secret, implying potentially important selection issues for our right-hand 
side variable. However, we expect that episodes involving a relatively small number of 
victims will be more likely to remain secret, while large-scale episodes will sooner or 
later become known. To ensure that our results can be generalized beyond these 
concerns, we constructed two 0/1 variables that excluded, respectively, episodes with 
fewer than 200 and 500 victims. Our probit results are robust to the use of these 
alternative dependent variables. 




In this paper we analyze the determinants of mass killings of unarmed civilians in 
the period from 1820 to 1998. To do so, we built a new data set (and the first one to our 
knowledge spanning for such a long time series) where we systematize episodes of mass 
killing and we study their relationship with the level of development and democracy 
across countries. 
We find that episodes of mass killing are more likely at intermediate levels of 
income and are less frequent only at the highest levels of democracy – only countries 
scoring a perfect 10 (the highest level in our index) for the whole decade, appeared to 
have a lower chance of mass killings once we controlled for their income levels. This 
finding is surprising, especially in light of the vast literature that indicates lack of 
democracy as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for gross human rights 
violations. However, we should be clear that lack of significance of democracy over most 
of its range is not the same as proof that democracy does not matter over this range; it is a 
lack of evidence that the effect of democracy over this range is nonzero rather than 
positive evidence that the effect is indeed zero.  
A closer look at the data reveals that a number of massacre episodes were 
perpetrated by highly democratic countries. Most of these though are concentrated in the 
XIXth century, when these countries were engaged in colonial expansion. When we 
restrict attention to the XXth century only, we find, more reassuringly, that countries in 
the highest quartile of democracy are significantly less likely to be engaged in mass 
killings. We should note, however, that, even in this context, the relationship between the 
likelihood of a massacre and democracy is not linear, implying that we have only found 
evidence that an improvement in the openness of institutions translates into a lower  
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chance of massacres when countries move to the highest level of democracy. Finally, we 
find that in the XXth century, discrete improvements in democracy were associated with 
less cruel massacre episodes. 
Our results are subject to a number of qualifications. First, as we are dealing with 
cross country estimates, there might be a number of confounding, unmeasured factors 
that make a causal interpretation of our results problematic. Second, and more important, 
the definition (and index) of democracy we adopt is limited to some specific features of 
the political process, namely the openness of political institutions. In democracies the 
majority has voice and representation and the fairness or openness of political institutions 
does not necessarily imply fair outcomes, unless specific clauses are embedded in the 
institutional setting (for example requiring qualified majority voting in the parliament, 
etc.). One should also note that in most cases of massacres perpetuated by democratic 
governments, the victims were not “voters” – in case of massacres in the imperialist 
period, they were citizens of the colonies, and even when the massacres were directed 
towards people within the polity (for example the Native Americans in North America), 
the victims did not have voting rights. One policy implication of our findings could be 
that democracy – an essential precondition – should be supplemented by human rights 
protection and other guarantees of individual rights to bring about beneficial outcomes 
for all.  
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Figure 3. Average number of victims by quartiles of development (log of GDP per 
capita) 
 












Figure 4. Average number of victims by quartiles of democracy 










Figure 5. Absolute number of victims by democracy quartiles 















Figure 6.  Average magnitude of mass killing episodes per decade (in logs) and per 
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Table 2. Basic probit analysis.  Dependent variable equals 1 if a mass killings episode occurred in a decade, 0 otherwise. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
XX  century  0.02  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  (0.38)  (0.79) (0.82) (1.13) (1.01) (1.12) (0.83) (1.03) (0.87) 
DEMOCRACY  -0.01*   0.00  0.0018       
  (1.84)   (0.31)  (0.58)       
LGDPPC   -0.07***  -0.07***  0.70**  0.65**  0.67**  -0.03*  0.51   
    (4.17) (3.32) (2.28) (1.98) (2.26) (1.69) (1.60)  
LGDPPC2       -0.05**  -0.05**  -0.05**    -0.04*   
        (2.49) (2.14) (2.51)   (1.71)  
DEMO10         -0.13***  -0.11*   
         (2.61)  (1.80)   
DEMO_HIGH       0.03     
        ( 0 . 9 9 )      
DEMO_QUART==2       -0.01     -0.01 
       (0.46)     (0.45) 
DEMO_QUART  ==3       0.01     0.01 
       (0.44)     (0.24) 
DEMO_QUART  ==4       -0.01     -0.04 
       (0.18)     (0.72) 
LGDPPC_QUART==2           -0.03 
           ( 0 . 7 5 )  
LGDPPC_QUART  ==3           0.01 
           ( 0 . 1 2 )  
LGDPPC_QUART  ==4           -0.14*** 
           ( 2 . 6 4 )  
LPOP    0.07***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
  (6.13)  (5.62) (5.60) (6.04) (5.91) (6.05) (5.91) (5.93) (6.01) 
LR test,   
P-value for 
lgdppc&lgdppc2==0 









Observations  906  902 902 902 902 902 902 902 902 
 Table 4. Probit analysis. XX century sample and additional correlates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Sample Full  XX  century 
Betweenwars  -0.10          
  (0.32)          
WWII  0.37          
  (1.16)          
postWWII  0.33          
  (1.39)          
XX century            0.05  0.05 
           (0.94)  (0.89) 
DEMOCRACY  0.02  -0.03        
  (0.87)  (1.30)        
LGDPPC 3.49**  -0.31***  0.25  -0.05**    0.52  0.48 
  (2.46)  (3.63)  (0.88) (2.52)   (1.64) (1.49) 
LGDPPC2 -0.26***    -0.02      -0.04*  -0.03 
 (2.67)    (1.05)      (1.79)  (1.55) 
DEMO10     -0.12*  -0.14**    -0.10*  -0.08 
      (1.94) (2.42)   (1.72) (1.34) 
DEMO_QUART==2        -0.01    
        (0.38)    
DEMO_QUART  ==3        -0.02    
        (0.55)    
DEMO_QUART  ==4        -0.11**    
        (2.10)    
LGDPPC_QUART==2        -0.06*    
        (1.77)    
LGDPPC_QUART  ==3        -0.04    
        (0.97)    
LGDPPC_QUART  ==4        -0.13***    
        (2.81)    
EF           0.57*   
           (1.89)   
EF2           -0.66**   
           (2.01)   
CWAR_D           0.30*** 
           ( 6 . 8 2 )  
CIIWAR_D           0.06* 
           ( 1 . 8 8 )  
LPOP  0.31***  0.30***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***  0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (6.27)  (5.59)  (5.78) (5.83) (5.66)  (5.67) (4.47) 
Observations  902  743  743 743 743  899 902 
Dependent variable equals 1 if an episode of mass killing occurred in the decade, 0 otherwise. Robust z statistics in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Table 4. Basic tobit analysis. Dependent variable (log) average number of victims in a decade. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
XX century  0.33  0.28  0.30  0.27 
 (1.11)  (1.07)  (1.27)  (1.21) 
DEMOCRACY   -0.029    -0.01   
 (1.07)    (0.70)   
LGDPPC -0.20*  -0.08  3.81**  2.76 
 (1.88)  (0.77)  (2.23)  (1.61) 
LGDPPC2     -0.26**  -0.19* 
     (2.35)  (1.67) 
DEMO10   -0.65***    -0.50* 
   (2.80)    (1.86) 
LPOP 0.39***  0.36***  0.39***  0.36*** 
 (7.37)  (7.70)  (7.58)  (7.45) 
LR test,   
P-value for 
lgdppc&lgdppc2==0 




Observations 846  846  846  846 
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Marginal coefficients are reported (unconditional expected value). 
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Table 5. Tobit analysis. XX century sample and additional correlates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample XX  century  Full 
DEMOCRACY    -0.04*  -0.05**     
  (1.86)  (2.22)     
LGDPPC 2.98*  -0.23**  2.28*  1.94  2.56** 
  (1.79) (2.26) (1.67) (1.47) (1.52) 
LGDPPC2  -0.21*    -0.15 -0.12 -0.18** 
  (1.92)   (1.63) (1.45) (1.62) 
LPOP  0.38*** 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 
  (7.27) (7.08) (5.88) (5.08) (6.51) 
XX  century      0.18 0.21 0.31 
      (0.97) (1.13) (1.33) 
EF     1.53 
      ( 1 . 0 1 )  
EF2      -2.11 
      ( 1 . 2 1 )  
DEMO10      -0.35 -0.33 -0.47 
      (1.41) (1.47) (-1.80) 
CWAR_D     1.98*** 1.97***  
      (8.37) (8.18)  
CIIWAR_D     0.42***   
     ( 2 . 6 2 )    
Observations  698 698 846 846 843 
Dependent variable (log) average number of victims in a decade. Absolute values of robust z statistics in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.. Marginal coefficients are 
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DEMOCRACY  Democracy index, ranging from 1 to 10 (measures the general 
openness of political institutions). The scale is constructed 
additively, using the following variables: PARCOMP 
(Competitiveness of participation: extent to which non-elites are 
able to access institutional structures for political expression); 
XRCOMP (Executive recruitment competition: extent to which 
executives are chosen through competitive elections); XROPEN 
(Executive recruitment openness: opportunity for non-elites to 
attain executive office); XCONST (Executive constraints: 
operational independence of chief executive). Whenever a modern 
polity originated from the merging of two or more old polities, the 
simple average of the constituting parts was used until the date of 
the union.  Whenever an old polity broke up into two or more 
modern entities, the values for the bigger state were used until the 
date of the division. Source: Polity Project, University of Maryland, 
College Park; years 1800-1998. 
 
DEMO10 Dummy  for  DEMOC=10 
 
DEMO_QUART       Dummies for quartiles of DEMOC. First quartile: DEMOC equal to 
                                  0; second quartile: DEMOC between 0 and 3; third quartile:  
                                  DEMOC between 3 and 8.78; fourth quartile: DEMOC bigger than  
                                  8.78 . 
 
DEMO_HIGH  Dummy taking value of 1 if DEMOCRACY is above the median in 
the sample. 
 
LGDPPC  Log of real GDP per capita in constant dollars (international prices, 
base year 1985). Source: Summers-Heston, years 1950-1998, and 
Maddison (1995), years 1820-1949. 
 
LGDPPC_QUART   Dummies for quartiles of LGDPPC. First quartile: LGDPPC less  
                                  than 6.81; second quartile: LGDPPC between 6.81 and 7.42; third  
                                  quartile: LGDPPC between 7.42 and 8.19; fourth quartile: LGDPPC  
                                  bigger than 8.19 
 
LPOP  Log of population. Source: Global Development Finance & World 
Development Indicators, World Bank, years 1960-1998, and 
Maddison (1995), years 1820-1959. 
 
XX CENTURY  Dummy for the 20
th century.  
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EF  Ethnic fractionalization index. Measures probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to 
the same ethnolinguistic group.  Source: Alesina et. al. (2003). 
 
CWAR_D    Dummy for civil war. Source: Singer and Small (1994). 
  
CIIWAR_D  Dummy for international, imperial or colonial war. International 
(interstate) wars are those fought among members of the interstate 
system. Imperial wars, involve an adversary that is an independent 
political entity but does not qualify as a member of the interstate 
system. Colonial wars include international wars in which an 
adversary was a colony, dependency or protectorate. Source: 





List of mass killing episodes 










Afghanistan  1978-92  1.5 to 2 million: mass murder of supporters 
of old regime and rural supporters of rebels 
(many ethnic Pushtuns) by Afghan 
Communist puppet regime and then more 
systematically by Soviet forces 
Fein (1992); 
Charny (1999) 
Algeria  1945  103: attack on European settlers after WW II  Kuper (1981) 
Algeria 1955  50  families:  attack on European settlers 
during revolution 
Kuper (1981) 
Algeria  1962  12,000-150,000: mass murder of Harkis 






Algeria  1992-98  70,000: killing of civilians by Islamic 
fundamentalists 
Charny (1999) 
Angola  1961-62  400: murder of Europeans during nationalist 
uprising 
Collelo (1989) 
Angola  1980-90  Massacre of indigenous group: San  Charny (1999) 
Argentina  1879-81  1,500: indigenous peoples massacred in 
Patagonia 
Rummel (1997)
Argentina  1976-80  9,000-30,000: mass murder of leftists  Fein (1992) 
Australia 1824-1908  10,000:  removal/killings  of the Aborigines  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996); Charny 
(1999) 
Azerbaijan 1988  Massacre/eviction of Armenians  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Azerbaijan  1990  Massacre of Armenians  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Bangladesh  1979-99  Massacre of indigenous group: Tribals  Charny (1999) 





Brazil  1886-97  Massacre of the Canudos colony in Bahia.  Jonassohn and 
Bjornson 
(1995) 
Brazil  1986-87  Massacre of indigenous group: Nambiquara  Charny (1999) 
Brazil  1988  Massacre of indigenous group: Ticuna  Charny (1999) 
Brazil  1988-89, 93 Massacre of indigenous group: Yanomami  Charny (1999)  
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
Brazil  1992  Massacre of indigenous group: Arara  Charny (1999) 
Burundi  1965-73  103,000-303,000: mass murder of Hutu 
leaders & peasants 
Fein (1992); 
Charny (1999) 
Burundi 1969,  72, 
88, 92, 93, 
95 
Massacres during Hutu-Tutsi conflicts   Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Burundi  1993  60,000: massacres during Hutu-Tutsi 
conflicts 
Charny (1999) 
Cambodia  1975-79  1.5 million: massacre of ethnic Vietnamese, 
intellectuals, middle-class people 
Andreopoulos 
(1994) 
Cambodia  1975-79  Massacre of indigenous group: Cham  Charny (1999) 
Canada  1500s-1900 Massacre of indigenous peoples  Charny (1999) 
Central African 
Republic 




Chile  1973-76  2,000-30,000: mass murder of leftists  Fein (1992) 
Chile  1976-83  79: kidnapping and "disappearance" of 
leftists under the Pinochet rule 
Charny (1999) 
Chile  1986  Massacre of indigenous group: Mapuche  Charny (1999) 
China  1850-1864  12,000,000: mass killings during Taiping 
Rebellion 
Rummel (1997)
China  1855-1873  600,000: mass killings during Moslem 
Rebellion 
Rummel (1997)
China  1860s  3,000,000: mass killings during Triad 
Rebellion 
Rummel (1997)
China 1920s-1949  10  million:  killing by nationalists before their 
final defeat on the mainland 
Charny (1999) 
China  1920s-1949 3.5 million: killing by Communists before 
their final victory on the mainland 
Charny (1999) 
China  1949-56  4,500,000 (until 1953): mass murder of 
landlords & rich peasants during land reform; 





China  1959-1979  1,200,000: Chinese occupation of Tibet  Freedom House 
(2001) 
China  1966-75  400,000-850,000: Cultural Revolution 
victims 
Fein (1992) 
Colombia 1879  40,000  Rummel  (1997)
Colombia  1948-58  180,000: "La Violencia" massacres by 
Liberal/Conservative governments 
Charny (1999) 
Colombia  1967-71  Mass killings of indigenous group: Cuiva  Charny (1999) 
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
Colombia  1999-2000  1,000-?: killing by right-wing paramilitary 
groups of alleged sympathizers of left-wing 
guerrillas 






1977-?  3,000-4,000: mass murder of tribal opponents 
& political opponents of Mobutu 
Fein (1992) 
Croatia  1941-45  500,000-655,000: massacre of Serbs, Jews, 
and Gypsies during WW II 
Charny (1999) 
Croatia  1993-95  Cleansing of Muslim and Serbian civilians 
from Bosnia during Bosnia war 
Charny (1999) 








El Salvador  1932  30,000: "La Matanza": Government 
repression of Indians (Pipil) and peasants 
Haggarty 
(1988) 
El Salvador  1980-1992  20,000-70,000: mass murder of leftists  Fein (1992) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1969-79  1,000-50,000: mass murder of Bubi tribe & 
political opponents of Macias 
Fein (1992) 
Ethiopia  1974-79  30,000: mass murder of political opposition  Fein (1992) 
Ethiopia  1984-85  Victims of forced resettlement  Fein (1992); 
Charny (1999) 
France  1830  1,800: demonstrators shot during Paris 
Uprising 
Rummel (1997)
France  1871  15,000: executions during Paris Commune  Rummel (1997)
France  1945  1,500 to 50,000 Muslims: reprisals from 
colonial authorities after attack on European 
settlers in Algeria 
Kuper (1981) 
France  1947-48  10,000-80,000: mass murder of Malagasy 
nationalists 
Fein (1992) 
France  1955  12,000 Muslims: reprisals from colonial 
authorities after attack on European settlers 
in Algeria 
Kuper (1981) 
Germany  1900-18  132,000: colonial massacres 
(among these: 65,000 during killings of 







Germany  1933-1945  6 million Jewish people; 3 million Poles; 
219,700 to 1.5 million Roma; 70,000 
disables; 5,000 to 15,000 homosexuals; 
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
Guatemala  1960-96  200,000: mass murder of indigenous group 
(Maya) & Leftists 
Charny (1999); 
Fein (1992); 
US State Dept 
(2001) 
Haiti  1804  Massacre of the French colonists  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Hungary  1919  590: "Red Terror"  Burant (1989) 
Hungary  1919  5,000: "White Terror"  Burant (1989) 
Hungary  1941  Massacre of Yugoslav citizens, mostly Serbs  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 




India  1968-82  1,000-3,000: mass murder of Naxalites  Fein (1992) 
India 1984  5,000-10,000:  killing  of Sikhs during anti-
Sikh violence 
Charny (1999) 
India  1992-93  Riots between Muslims and Hindus, violence 
mostly suffered by Muslims 
Human Rights 
Watch (1995) 
Indonesia 1965-67  500,000-1,000,000:  anti-Communist, anti-
Chinese massacre 
Fein (1992) 
Indonesia  1976-87  East Timor massacres by Indonesian army 









20,000: Baha' is put to death  Rummel (1997)
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 





1981-?  10,000-20,000: mass murder of Kurds, 
Baha'is, & Mujahedeen 
Fein (1992) 
Iraq  1959-75  Mass murder of Kurdish nationalists  Fein (1992) 
Iraq  1988  5,000: Iraqi Kurds victims  Andreopoulos 
(1994) 




Israel  1948  254: Palestinians killed in Deir Yassin by 




Israel  1982  700-800: Sabra & Shatila massacre of 
refugees (mostly Palestinians) by Christian 




Barak and Efrat 
(1983)  
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
Israel  1987-1993  1,095 (800 until 1990): Palestinians killed by 






Italy  1937  30,000: Mass executions of Ethiopians by 




Japan  1935-39  4 to 6.3 million: massacre of Chinese, 
including Rape of Nanking (200,000 victims) 
Charny (1999) 
Japan  1935-39  20,000: massacre of Indonesian civilians by 




Massacre of Jewish refugees  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Kenya  1991-94  1,500: violence in tribal clashes  Human Rights 
Watch (1995) 
Lao PDR  1963-?  18,000-20,000: mass murder of Meo 
tribesmen 
Fein (1992) 
Lao PDR  1979-86  Mass killings of indigenous group: H'mong  Charny (1999) 




Liberia  1990  600: massacre of refugees in a church by 
government troops 
Charny (1999) 
Mali  1988-90  Massacre of indigenous group: Tuareg  Charny (1999) 
Mongolia  1929-32  Killings among monastic class, nobility and 
political opposition; collectivization and 
Party purges by Communists 
Worden and 
Savada(1989) 
Myanmar  1978  Mass murder of Muslims in border region  Fein (1992) 




      
Netherlands  1873-1913  30,000-100,000: massacre during occupation 
of Sumatra 
Rummel (1997)
Nicaragua  1981-86  Massacre of indigenous group: Miskito  Charny (1999) 
Niger  1988-90  Massacre of indigenous group: Tuareg  Charny (1999) 






Pakistan  1946-47  Massacre and flight of indigenous peoples  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Pakistan  1958-74  Mass murder of Baluchi tribesmen  Fein (1992) 
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      







1988  Massacre of indigenous group: Dani  Charny (1999) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1990-91  Massacre of indigenous group: Nasioi  Charny (1999) 




Paraguay  1990-91  Massacre of indigenous group: Pai Tavytere  Charny (1999) 
Philippines  1968-85  10,000-100,000: mass murder of Moro 
(Muslim) nationalists 
Fein (1992) 
Philippines  1987  Massacre of indigenous group: Atta  Charny (1999) 
Poland  1945-48  1,583,000: removal of Germans  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996); Charny 
(1999) 
Portugal  1961-62  40,000: mass murder of Bakongo during 
suppression of nationalist uprising in Angola 
Fein (1992); 
Collelo (1989) 




Romania 1919,  36, 
40, 49, 56, 
59, 90 
Romanian-Hungarian conflict in 
Transylvania (under Romanian control) 
Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Romania  1989-93  10: killing of Romas and burning of Roma 
homes by ethnic Romanians and ethnic 























1919  700,000: mass killing of the Cossacks during 
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 











1932-33  5 to 7 million: artificially induced famine of 








1937-38  1,000,000: execution of Communist Party 












1943-47  500,000-1,100,000: mass murder of 





1943-57  230,000: mass murder of Chechens, Ingushi, 





1944-68  57,000-175,000: mass murder of 














1949  50,000 to 60,000: deportation of Estonians  Charny (1999) 
Rwanda  1959-94  Massacres during Hutu-Tutsi conflicts   Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 




Rwanda  1994  850,000-860,000: massacres during Hutu-
Tutsi conflicts  
Charny (1999) 
Rwanda  1996-97  50,000-100,000: killings of Hutu refugees 
from Rwanda and Burundi in Congo by Tutsi 
army from Rwanda 
Charny (1999) 
Somalia  1988-89  Mass murder of Issak clan (Northerners)  Fein (1992) 
South Africa  1980-90  Massacre of indigenous group in occupied 
Namibia: San 
Charny (1999)  
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
South Africa  1990-94  14,000: political violence during the 




Spain  1936-39  430,000: killing of soldiers and civilians by 
Loyalists and Fascists during Spanish Civil 
War and more killing of Loyalists by Fascists 
after war 
Charny (1999) 
Sri Lanka  1958, 71, 
77, 81, 83-
86, 95 
40,000: Tamil-Sinhalese conflict  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 









Sudan  1991-92  Mass killings of indigenous group: Nuba  Charny (1999) 
Sudan  1992-93  Mass killing of indigenous group: Kinka, 
Nuer 
Charny (1999) 








1981-82  5,000-25,000: mass murder of Muslim 
Brotherhood 
Fein (1992) 
Taiwan  1947  10,000-40,000: mass murder of Taiwanese 
nationalists 
Fein (1992) 
Turkey  1822-23  68,000: Greeks killed  Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1826  20,000-39,800: Janissaries massacred  Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1850  10,000: Mosul Assyrians massacred  Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1850  10,000: Kurdistan massacre  Rummel (1997)





Turkey  1881  2,000: Alexandria massacre of 
Armenians/other Christians 
Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1881  4,000: death sentences of Albanians  Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1892  3,500: massacre of Turkified Armenians and 
foreign soldiers 
Rummel (1997)
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      






Turkey 1876-79  15,000:  killing/massacre of Bulgars  Rummel (1997)
Turkey  1894-96  200,000 (8% of total Armenian population in 
Turkey): massacres of Armenians by Kurds 
Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Turkey 1914-1918  Massacres/eviction  of Nestorian and Jacobite 
Christians and the Maronites of Lebanon 
Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Turkey  1915-1918  Massacres of Armenians (1.5 million in 
Armenia; 30,000 in Baku; 32,000 in Shusha) 
Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
Turkey  1924-1927  As many as 30,000: anti-Kurdish campaigns  Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996); Metz 
(1995) 
Turkey  1922, 1974  30,000: massacre of Christians (mostly 








Uganda  1971-79  100,000-500,000: mass murder of 
Karamojong, Acholi, Lango, Catholic clergy, 




Uganda  1979-86  50,000-100,000: mass murder of 
Karamojong, Nilotic tribes, Bagandans, & 
supporters of Amin regime 
Fein (1992) 
USA  1500s-1900 Massacre of indigenous peoples  Charny (1999) 
USA  1830s  17: expulsion of Mormon communities from 





25,000: total indigenous battle-
dead/massacred/killed 
Rummel (1997)
Vietnam  1953-54  15,000: mass murder of Catholic landlords & 
rich and middle peasants 
Fein (1992) 
Vietnam  1965-72  475,000: mass murder of civilian in NLF 
areas 
Fein (1992) 
Vietnam  1975-87  250,000: mass murder of "Boat people" 
(Vietnamese/Chinese) 
Charny (1999) 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
1948  77: Israeli civilians killed by Arab troops on 





West Bank and 
Gaza 
1987-1994  171: Israelis killed during Intifada  Bloomberg 
(1993) 
Yugoslavia  1945-48  36,000 to 60,000: crush of Albanian 
resistance of Serbian rule in Kosovo 
Bell-Fialkoff 
(1996) 
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COUNTRY YEAR  VICTIMS  SOURCE 
      
Yugoslavia  1991-95  200,000: killing of Muslims and Croats in 
Bosnia during Bosnia war. 
Charny (1999); 
US State Dept 
(1999) 
Yugoslavia  1999  10,000-100,000: cleansing of Albanian 
Muslims by Serbians during Kosovo war 
Charny (1999) 
Zimbabwe  1982-83  Killings of indigenous group: Tyua  Charny (1999) 
 
 
 